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English source · 3 min

Independent App job supervision acceptance, 6 November 2026

Source: Apps 0.29.0 at f9524c6ee07a4a1fb201a0a2e6cebe3d81074b00, Data service 0.5.0, unchanged model 0.13.0 and authority 0.2.0. Operator setup and executable SDK example.

Delivered operations and ownership

HTTP POST /v1/jobs/list, /v1/jobs/detail, /v1/jobs/control, MCP apps.jobs.list/detail/control, OpenAPI and contract version 5 use the same scoped history and original atomic control engine. Shared src/job_projection.rs extracts native current-rights/current-package result redaction and queued-event selection. Native src/apps/jobs.rs delegates to it through its actual current authority adapter; authentication, actor/detail checks, retry input admission and execution remain with their original owners.

The explicit schema-5 profile adds one fixed job table/index with signed forced RLS. Its nonowner serving login has exact control-column writes and terminal-only archival, no enqueue/input/result/message/identity/schema grants. Earlier profiles do not inherit job authority. Trusted producers provision already-admitted worker packages/jobs separately. There is no new worker, public seed, result API, issuer or automatic external-effect dispatcher.

Actual independent process acceptance

data-service/tests/job_cases.py uses the actual Rust service, PostgreSQL and fixed current identity endpoint. Synthetic existing jobs/packages are provisioned only by the separate trusted fixture producer; all supervision uses real APIs.

  • History is bounded with stable creation-time/ID ordering and scoped cursors. Hostile group labels do not become SQL or authority. Missing cursors conflict.
  • Two shops and different actors have distinct visibility. Revoked primary or additional rights and stale package digests redact message/result. Inputs, leases and internal row digests do not enter responses.
  • Detail requires original actor or administrator, current action rights and an active matching package. Current administrative scope, personal/live claims, exact package/revision and explicit approval gate controls.
  • Explicit false approval, unknown operations, null fields, foreign identity properties and stale digest/revision are rejected. A real negative test caught reliance on an unsupported JSON Schema const; the host now checks the actual approval boolean before entering its transaction.
  • Queued cancellation, retained running-worker lease, expired uncertainty, reviewed retry/resolution and terminal archival pass. Retry checks current action rights and stored input against the current schema before emitting a queued signal. It cannot fabricate successful worker completion.
  • Competing controls yield one success/one conflict. Late outbox failure rolls back updates and archival deletion. Exhausted revision rejects safely.
  • Actual serving SQL cannot enqueue, forge input/result/identity, create schema objects or delete active work. Missing or excessive grants reject startup.
  • The unchanged generic SDK lists, inspects and explicitly cancels a real queued fixture job. MCP and HTTP agree; state survives restart.

The existing reader, portable managed-write, encrypted settings and complete portable-install journeys remain passing in the same independent process test. The real shared PostgreSQL contract and a focused stale/revoked-result unit regression also pass. Production host SQL/network/authority remain unproved by Lean; the original verified kernel is unchanged.

Remaining lifecycle boundary

This acceptance covers supervision of existing jobs. Independent producer/worker hosting, callback evidence, dispatch, recovery and full release orchestration remain separate checklist work. It requires no native production schema or credential change and does not create a new publicly hosted App Data service.

Integrated and container acceptance

The native binary passes apps, app_jobs, app_studio, tenant_isolation and app_shared_storage through actual HTTP/PostgreSQL with separate signed system and tenant logins. Adversarial SQL checks reject forged actor/shop/system scope, key/identity-secret reads, schema/projection changes and system-ticket reuse. All 74 App unit tests pass.

Component CI passes storage, runtime, service and data-reader jobs. The actual container repeats the independent supervisor/settings/install/records acceptance with nonroot user 10001, a read-only filesystem, no capabilities and no new privileges. Component change.